South America has seen increased interest in interregional economic and political cooperation over the last decades. Inspired by the European Union, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) became the official body of regional integration in South America in 2008. Plans for a regional currency within the UNASUR have returned to the political agenda following a prolonged period of silence on the topic amid turbulences in the Eurozone. Spanning the period 1979-2012, this paper analyses the viability of a monetary union between nine UNASUR members from a generalised purchasing power parity (G-PPP) perspective. It finds evidence for a unique cointegrating relationship between the countries' monthly real exchange rates when the period of the Latin American debt crisis is omitted. The analysis provides support for monetary integration in that it shows the region to be economically interlinked. Nevertheless, adjustments to macroeconomic shocks appear asymmetric suggesting further economic integration is necessary for a monetary union to be viable.
Introduction
The creation of the Eurozone has triggered increased research interest in the feasibility of currency unions in several geographic areas. The reason for considering a common currency for a set of countries is that, under the right circumstances, a common currency maximises economic efficiency. Researchers who investigated the prospects of a monetary union in South America in the immediate years after the creation of the Eurozone have criticised the lack of necessary economic and political integration as potential factors impeding the efficiency of a common currency. Yet, the idea of a monetary union has attracted serious political interest in South America.
Recently, a major step towards political and economic integration in South America has been taken with the formation of the Union of South American Nations (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, UNASUR) in 2008. Although the group's institutionalisation remains slow, continued integration efforts are likely to increase the potential efficiency gains from a monetary union. It is therefore the objective of this paper to re-evaluate the prospects of a monetary union for South America. Rather than relying on the standard optimum currency area (OCA) theory, this paper complements the existing literature by applying the theory of Generalised Purchasing Power Parity (G-PPP), developed by Enders and Hurn (1994) . It thereby assesses whether the macroeconomic fundamentals underlying the real exchange rates of UNASUR members are sufficiently integrated to advocate the formation of a monetary union.
Firstly, it builds the theoretical framework by providing some background on the process of political and economic integration in South America focusing on institutional developments. It furthermore reviews the existing literature on the assessment of the feasibility of regional monetary integration. Secondly, it reviews G-PPP theory as developed by Enders and Hurn (1994) . Thirdly, it empirically tests G-PPP in South America by means of unit root and cointegration tests during the sample period of 1979 to 2012. It thereafter proposes a reduced sample excluding the period of the Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s. Fourthly, it provides a discussion of the empirical results before pointing out the paper's limitations.
Finally, it concludes that there is clear evidence that the UNASUR constitutes a potential common currency area from a pure G-PPP perspective. Nevertheless, persisting political and economic instabilities across the region negatively affect monetary integration considerations and the benefits from the formation of a monetary union thus remain unclear.
Theoretical framework

Process of political and economic integration in South America
The history of regional integration in South America dates back to the early nineteenth century when Simon Bolivar, leader of Latin America's independence movement, shared his vision of a South American republic (Council of Hemispheric Affairs, 2013) . Nevertheless, the institutionalisation of the integrating process did not start until 1948 when the Organization of American States (OAS) was established, constituting a political, juridical, and social governmental forum promoting democracy, human rights, security and development (OAS, 2015) . The first regional and sub-regional economic blocs formed in the 1960s, notably the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC), and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), formerly known as Andean Pact. The customs union CAN also comprises a financial arm known as the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) which serves as a development bank in Latin and South America covering 17 Latin American and Caribbean countries (CAF, 2015) .
In 1991 the Common Market for the South (Mercosur) was created to enable the free movement of goods, services, capital and people among its member states and establish a common trade policy. Mercosur comprises five South American countries neither of which are members of CAN (figure 1). (Peña, 2009) Increasing inter-connectedness in the region and the acknowledgment of the large area's potential comprised under the different trade agreements led to the foundations of the intergovernmental union UNASUR. Through integrating the two pre-existing regional trade unions (figure 1), Mercosur and CAN, the UNASUR further develops the institutional framework for South America. By superseding sole economic cooperation it adds a political dimension to the integration process. (Peña, 2009) The UNASUR's founding treaty was signed by twelve member states, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana 1 , Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Mexico and Panama currently hold observer status. In its modelling after the European Union, the UNASUR is intended to promote cultural, social, political and economic integration in the region and develop a South American identity and citizenship. Some of the ambitious goals were the establishment of a continental free trade zone, a South American parliament, and a single currency. (UNASUR, 2014) So far, the UNASUR mainly serves as a public forum for policy makers to establish political links, promote trade and inclusive social and human development. It is also a platform for proposing action plans for further integration. In contrast, the coexisting trade blocs CAN and Mercosur are based on concrete legal agreements. In an effort to strengthen the UNASUR's influence and ensure its longevity, permanent headquarters have been established in Quito, Ecuador and were inaugurated in December 2014.
In order to develop the internal market within the UNASUR, a stable currency without fluctuation risks offers advantages beyond the reduction of transactions costs for intra-UNASUR trade. Many UNASUR member countries have a history of unstable macroeconomic environments marked by high inflation, repeated currency devaluations and high indebtedness.
Regional coordination of sustainable macroeconomic policies targeting low inflation, fiscal discipline, and a rejection of government spending financed by the central bank would counteract these weaknesses. Furthermore, a stable common currency would symbolise strength and thereby aid in enhancing economic and political stability. Credible, supranational institutions, such as a central bank and a mechanism providing for the coordination of fiscal policies would further support stability. Recognising these benefits, the member states originally had plans to form a monetary union within the UNASUR.
As a step towards monetary cooperation, the creation of a Banco del Sur (Bank of the South) was formalised in December 2007. The Bank is to serve as a regional financing facility to sponsor development projects and provide emergency assistance across the region. All UNASUR members were invited to join the Bank but only four countries have formally approved its charter (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) . In contrast to the regionally criticised IMF and World Bank lending conditions, Banco del Sur lending was not to be conditional on deregulatory policy measures. The slow progress of the UNASUR member states' approval of the project underlines persisting resistance to further regional integration.
A factor influencing the climate of opinion on monetary integration has been the Eurozone crisis. The crisis highlighted that price stability does not necessarily guarantee financial stability. The mere introduction of a common currency does not replace the need for internal adjustment if it covers diverse states. Within UNASUR, economies are strikingly diverse. Currently, the member states' exchange rate regimes and monetary policy arrangements vary widely. The choice of an exchange rate regime and can have significant implications not only for price and financial stability, and economic growth and development. (Berg, Borensztein, & Mauro, 2003) 
Monetary integration assessment methods and literature review
Monetary integration across sovereign states has long been subject of public debate and there are several aspects which contribute to the discussion on the viability of such supranational policy measures. Mundell (1961) , McKinnon (1963) , and Kenen (1969) Researchers, who have examined different combinations of South American countries within the scope of the OCA framework, have not found sufficient support to make the case for a monetary union. Berg, Borensztein, and Mauro (2002) follow a qualitative approach to examine different monetary regime options for South America. They conclude that due to the small volume of mutual trade, diverse economic shocks, and uncoordinated business cycles, the costs of a common currency are likely to outweigh its costs (Berg, Borensztein, Mauro, 2002) .
Similarly, Hochreiter, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Winckler (2002) conduct a literature review and analyse recent trends in monetary and exchange-rate regimes across the region. They find no evidence for long run sustainability of a monetary union due to low intra-regional trade, idiosyncratic shocks, wide disparities in the political and institutional environment, and a lack of homogeneity in economic development (Hochreiter, Schmidt-Hebbel, Winckler, 2002) .
Examining external shocks and economic performance in countries belonging to existing or historic currency union, Edwards (2006) interprets that a common currency is not likely to economically strengthen the South American region.
Analyses evaluating a region's suitability for a monetary union based on the OCA framework often rely on ad hoc proxies, because the OCA criteria lack a unifying framework. This makes an evaluation difficult and may lead to inconclusive results instead of providing a clear answer as to whether a region is suitable for a common currency (Tavlas, 1994) . For instance, a country may be open to trade towards a particular group of countries, suggesting a benefit from a fixed exchange rate. On the other hand, the country may also display factor immobility. In the presence of asymmetric shocks, exchange rate re-alignment would then be important as the production factors cannot exercise a stabilisation function by shifting across the countries. Due to these conflicting indications, clear normative implications are not easily obtainable under an assessment of OCA criteria.
Despite the fact that numerous authors have not found supporting evidence in favour of the formation of a monetary union in South America, existing research does not consider the viability of a monetary union within the regional bloc UNASUR. Instead, it focuses on different combinations and subgroups of South American countries. This is partially due to the fact that much of the existing research in the field has been conducted before the formation of the UNASUR. Hence, the distinct effects of the UNASUR, which has seen South American nations actively seeking to increase economic and political integration, are not included.
This paper takes a different approach by applying the theory of G-PPP based on Enders and Hurn (1994) to the UNASUR bloc using more recent data than previous analyses. The timeframe of the analysis spans from 1979 to 2014. The underlying assumption of G-PPP theory is that exchange rate movements have an important effect on monetary policies. The theory serves to assess whether exchange rate movements are similar enough to support a monetary union by investigating common trends among exchange rates. An existence of common trends would support a synchronisation of monetary policies, whilst an absence would make a monetary union undesirable.
The analysis thus seeks to identify whether the driving factors of the real exchange rates are sufficiently integrated across the UNASUR countries to advocate a common currency using cointegration and stability tests. It specifically seeks to clarify whether there is evidence for an equilibrium real exchange rate in the region based on the G-PPP framework and therefore a motivation for monetary integration. The paper thereby contributes to the existing literature on monetary policy choices for South America by complimenting the discussion with a G-PPP perspective. It adds the necessary empirical value to current political considerations, which tend to be strongly influenced by negative experiences in the Eurozone.
Methodology
This section briefly describes the G-PPP theory and estimation procedure. More details on the theory can be found in Enders and Hurn (1994) . The theory of G-PPP is based on the assumption that the macroeconomic fundamentals underlying the real exchange rates tend to be nonstationary so that the real exchange rates themselves are also generally non-stationary. If the macroeconomic fundamentals across a group of countries are sufficiently interrelated, the real rates will share common trends and the country grouping of the real exchange rates may be stationary. Consequently, a natural currency area among the country grouping will be implied based on commonalities in the economic drivers of the members' exchange rates. If the group of countries does not share the same real disturbances, or if the adjustment speed is very different or very slow, there is no motivation from a G-PPP perspective, to advocate a common currency.
More formally, Enders and Hurn (1994) denote the long-run equilibrium relationship between the m bilateral real exchange rates of m+1countries in the domain of a potential currency area within an n-country world as 12 = 13 13 + 14 14 + ⋯ + 1 1 + where 1 denotes the logarithmic RERs in period t between the base country 1 and country i, It is important to point out here that if each country's currency was pegged to a common currency, the RERs would be constant across the bloc. This would shift the focus of the analysis solely on inflation differentials. (Wilson & Choy, 2007) The mentioning of this point is particularly relevant in this analysis since, as outlined above, many of the UNASUR members had or continue to have a monetary agreement with the US dollar. Yet, pegs to the dollar still leave ample room for variation in the real rates due to differences in the duration and extent of the pegging periods. Therefore, the analysis remains valid.
Testing G-PPP in South America
The analysis considers the natural logarithm of the real effective exchange rates (REERs) of the UNASUR members against a basket of currencies including monthly data from M12 1979 to M7 2014. The data is obtained from the IMF's International Financial Statistics database, where, given a set of weights for the home country i on its trade partners ( ≠ ), the REER index of country i is based on the following formula:
where j denotes the trading partners, P denotes the consumer price index, and and refer to the bilateral nominal exchange rates of country i and j against the US dollar (measured in US dollar per local currency). The index is thus a geometric weighted average of bilateral exchange rates between country i and its trade partners. (Bayoumi, Lee, & Jayanthi, 2006) Due to data limitations Argentina, Peru, and Suriname are excluded from the analysis.
Unit root testing and cointegration analysis
Empirical results complete sample
The first step of the analysis is to establish whether the real exchange rates are individually nonstationary. Initial visual inspection of the UNASUR members' REERs suggests that the REERs are non-stationary in levels and stationary in first differences (appendix 9.1.1, figure 5a-i).
Formal Dickey-Fuller tests are performed, testing the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative of stationarity. The test results (appendix 9.1.1) indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root in the REER series cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance level for any country in the sample except Bolivia (p-value = 0.0002). When the augmented version of the Dickey-fuller test is applied with one specified lag, the null of a unit root can only be rejected for Bolivia and Brazil, with p-values of 0.0005 and 0.0563 respectively (appendix 9.1.1).
Given this result the analysis proceeds with tests for cointegration of the REER series, based on the assumption of a unit root in all REER series. Johansen's testing procedure for cointegration and stability tests is used to identify whether the real fundamentals are sufficiently interrelated to find evidence for an equilibrium real exchange rate in the region. Based on the Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQIC) method and the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) method, one lag is specified (appendix 9.1.2, table 6).
Johansen's testing procedure firstly tests for zero cointegrating equations and then accepts the first null hypothesis which cannot be rejected. In the specification with one lag and a constant trend, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is strongly rejected and we fail to reject the null hypothesis of at most two cointegrating equations. Consequently, we accept the null hypothesis that there are two cointegrating equations in the multivariate model. An estimation of the multivariate cointegrating vector error-correction model (VECM) for the REER series yields the parameters of the cointegrating vectors. The remainder of the analysis, which addresses another concern in the model, proceeds with Bolivia as the normalised country. The LM test clearly indicates serial correlation in the residuals (appendix 9.2.4). Based on Gonzalo (1994), serial correlation can stem from underspecifying the number of lags in a VECM. Therefore, the model is re-estimated using four rather than two lags. The output is displayed in table 5 below. 
Discussion
Enders and Hurn's model only provides little guidance with respect to interpreting the cointegration results and a formal benchmark for the interpretation of the coefficients is missing. Whilst Enders and Hurn (1994) clearly state that evidence for a cointegration relationship is necessary to make the case for a monetary union, they do not address the required size of the coefficients in the cointegration equation. Yet, it is obvious that large coefficients would be a signal for large asymmetries and would therefore not be a good indicator for the viability of a common currency. Determining such a threshold remains a challenge.
Whilst there is clear evidence for a cointegration relationship among the nine South American countries, it is difficult to interpret multiple cointegration vectors, as found in part one of the above analysis. Therefore, the focus of the interpretation lies on the reduced sample spanning from 1986 to 2012.
Leaving out the period of the Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s, a clear cointegrating relationship with a single cointegration vector is found ( 
Limitations
As data is missing for Argentina, Peru, and Suriname, the conclusions drawn from the analysis cannot be generalised for the overall UNASUR group. Whilst Peru and Suriname have small economies, Argentina's economy plays a strong role in the region and its inherent instability along several lines is likely to have a major impact on the analysis. Including the three countries into the analysis might therefore change the results drawn in this paper, and any political conclusions drawn from this report have to take this into account.
Additionally, no data for a base currency within the country set was available and a basket of 
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